Abilities and the Sources of Unfreedom by Schmidt, Andreas
  
 University of Groningen






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2016
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Schmidt, A. (2016). Abilities and the Sources of Unfreedom. Ethics, 127(1), 179–207.
https://doi.org/10.1086/687335
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Abilities and the Sources of Unfreedom*
Andreas T. Schmidt
What distinguishes constraints on our actions that make us unfree (in the socio-
political sense) from those that make us merely unable? I provide a new account:
roughly, a constraint makes a person unfree, if and only if, first, someone else was
morally responsible for the constraint and, second, it impedes an ability the per-
son would have in the best available distribution of abilities. This new account is
shown to overcome shortcomings of existing proposals. Moreover, by linking its
account of unfreedom to distributions of abilities, it offers an attractive combi-
nation of so-called positive and negative views of freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many factors constrain what we are able to do. For example, because of
physical constraints, I am unable to run one hundred meters in under
ten seconds. I am also unable to remember the first fifty thousand digits
of p given my cognitive limitations. Among all possible constraints on
our ability, however, one class seems of particular importance. As Isaiah
Berlin writes: “You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are pre-
vented from attaining a goal by other human beings. Mere incapacity to
attain a goal is not lack of political freedom.”1 The distinction between
inability (or ‘mere incapacity’) and unfreedom is of not only theoretical
but, as David Miller observes, also normative importance: “to describe a
state of affairs as involving unfreedom is to . . . make a move in a political
argument. There is no such presumption in cases of inability which are
not also describable as cases of unfreedom. . . . The fact that millions of
men are unable to fly to the moon moves us not at all.”2 In many cases,
1. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” inFour Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969), 118–72, 122.
* I am very grateful for the detailed and insightful comments I received from David
Miller, John Broome, Ian Carter, Lucas Stanczyk, Nicholas Vrousalis, Hasko von Kriegstein,
Ronen Shnayderman, Luara Ferracioli, Pietro Intropi, two anonymous reviewers, and the
editors of Ethics. I should also thank members of the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop,
Zosia Stemplowska, Franc¸ois Hudon, Harvey Lederman, Lucia Rafanelli, the Questing
Voles, and Louis-Philippe Hodgson for helpful discussions.
2. David Miller, “Constraints on Freedom,” Ethics 94 (1983): 66–86, 69.
179
Ethics 127 (October 2016): 179–207
© 2016 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2016/12701-0008$10.00
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on January 30, 2019 03:26:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
it is contested whether we should speak of inability or unfreedom. For
example, is a poor person’s lack of health care a constraint on her free-
dom? Is it a case of unfreedom, if a person with physical disabilities is not
given enough support to be able to fully partake in social life? Apart from
such specific questions, there is the more general question as to which
political, social, and economic system grants people the most freedom.
It is commonly thought that to answer these and other important
questions, requires, among other things, a criterion with which to distin-
guish obstacles that count as sources of unfreedom from those which are
mere inabilities. In this article, I first discuss existing proposals for such
a criterion. After outlining some of their shortcomings, I then provide
a new view—the Distributive View—whose main idea is this: an obstacle y
makes a person A unfree as opposed to merely unable to J, if and only
if there is (at least) one other person who is morally responsible for im-
posing or not removing y or for not preventing y’s creation, y impedes A
from J-ing, and A would have the ability to J in the best available distribu-
tion of abilities.
What follows is structured in three parts. Section II features a discus-
sion of some existing proposals to distinguish unfreedom from inability.
In Sections III and IV, I introduce my new criterion to draw said distinc-
tion. In Section V, I present advantages of this proposal and defuse pos-
sible objections.
II. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
Before starting, two clarifications are in order. First, Charles Taylor dis-
tinguishes between freedom as an opportunity concept and freedom as
an exercise concept.3 The former is about social freedom conceptual-
ized on the basis of a person’s range of opportunities. The latter is about
whether a person’s decisions, acts, and attitudes and maybe her entire
way of being are free. I will not discuss freedom as an exercise concept
here. Instead, I will be exclusively concerned with freedom as an oppor-
tunity concept (or freedom in the ‘sociopolitical’ sense).
Second, I will here only discuss of what source an obstacle needs to
be to count as an unfreedom-producing constraint. Apart from its source,
we might also be interested in an obstacle’s strength. Some think that
unfreedom-producing constraints necessarily make an action impos-
sible. Others hold that it is enough if a constraint makes an act more
difficult. I remain neutral on this point. I assume the impossibility view
in some examples to keep things simple.4 When stating the different prin-
3. See Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty,” in The Idea of Freedom, ed.
Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175–93.
4. SeeHillel Steiner, “Individual Liberty,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974):
33–50; Miller, “Constraints on Freedom”; Kristjan Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom: The Respon-
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ciples, I will say that a constraint ‘impedes another person from doing
something’. This deliberately ambiguous wording allows for different
views on the impossibility/difficulty issue.
I will now discuss existing theories. The aim is not to present de-
feating critiques. Rather, I will give a brief overview of the debate, offer
some prima facie objections to more recent proposals, and, by doing so,
set the stage for my own view.
A. Intentions and Causality
Sources of unfreedoms are typically considered ‘man-made’ or ‘inter-
personal’. If someone locks me into her basement, for example, I am sub-
jected to a constraint imposed by another person. Compare this with
mere inabilities: the constraints that make me unable to fly to Mars or
unable to run one hundred meters in under ten seconds do not seem
attributable to another person. Unfreedom is typically considered a so-
cial relation, and distinguishing it from mere inability is supposed to cap-
ture that.
The first suggestion to characterize unfreedom invokes intention-
ality:
The Intention View: y is an unfreedom-producing constraint on
person A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing
and (ii) there is at least one person other than A who intentionally
imposed y.5
I use the formulation ‘at least one person’ to allow for the possibility of col-
lective agents imposing unfreedom-producing constraints.6 For simplicity,
I drop the ‘other than A’ in the formulations that follow.
It is usually objected that the Intention View is too narrow. Some-
times people will impose constraints—or fail to prevent them—uninten-
tionally but negligently. For example:
Closed Door : I am in my room and the wind blows the door shut
(which can only be opened from the outside). The janitor who is
responsible for checking the door around that time went on a
private errand and forgot about his duties.
5. Theorists who have adopted the Intention View are F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of
Liberty (Oxford: Routledge, 1960); and J. P. Day, “Is the Concept of Freedom Essentially
Contestable?” Philosophy 61 (1986): 116–23, 117.
6. Matthew Braham, “Measuring Specific Freedom,” Economics and Philosophy 22 (2006):
317–33, 322.
sibility View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Ian Carter, AMeasure of Freedom
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) for more on this question.
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Despite the lack of intention, one might say that I am nonetheless un-
free to leave the room.7
Alternatively, we could widen our criterion by focusing on causal
responsibility:
The Wide Causal View: y is an unfreedom-producing constraint
on A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing and
(ii) there is at least one person whose action(s) or omission(s) is
(are) causally responsible for y.
However, theWide Causal View is too wide. Because it includes omissions
as sources of unfreedom, it would label too many inabilities as unfree-
doms. For a vast number of ability constraints could be removed through
a societal effort. For example, if society pooled all its resources, I could
live in a golden castle. But it seems absurd to say that the omission of
providing me with a golden castle makes me unfree.
Matthew Kramer, a proponent of the Causal View, thus excludes omis-
sions as possible sources of unfreedom. Instead, he only allows causes which
are either actions or dispositions to act:8
TheNarrowCausalView: y is an unfreedom-producing constraint
on A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing and
(ii) there is at least one person whose action(s) or disposition(s) to
perform actions is (are) causally responsible for y.
Critics of this view, however, hold that the Narrow Causal View is still too
wide. Long causal chains will include human influences in the long dis-
tant past. For example:
Roaming : I am walking on the Piazza del Colosseo in Rome on
a rainy autumn day. A wet leaf falls from a tree to the ground. On its
way it is deflected by the coliseum so that it changes its course and
lands right under my foot. I slip over the leaf and break my leg.
The Narrow Causal View would say that the people who built the coli-
seum made me unfree. However, this might strike some as counterintui-
tive, as the causal contribution seems too insignificant to count as an
unfreedom-producing constraint. Moreover, we expect our account to
flesh out the pretheoretic idea that freedom is a type of social relation. It
7. See Miller, “Constraints on Freedom,” 71. Kristja´nsson presents similar arguments;
see Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom, 23.
8. See Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), chap. 4.
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seems surprising that such an account should cover relations between
me and Roman builders or other humans in ancient or prehistoric times.9
Ronen Shnayderman presents an objection to Kramer’s position in-
tended to go beyond intuition. He argues that Kramer’s account is so ex-
pansive in its classification of unfreedoms that it does not do well by some
of Kramer’s own standards. Specifically, when Kramer defends the exclu-
sion of omissions as possible sources of unfreedom, he argues that doing
so is necessary to avoid that all instances of self-inflicted inabilities and
mere inabilities imposed by natural forces are considered unfreedoms.10
Shnayderman now argues that Kramer’s own account of unfreedom would
shrink the range of inabilities classified as self-inflicted or as merely nat-
ural inabilities “almost to vanishing point”: “virtually every self-inflicted
(as well as natural) inability is caused, in part, by someone else’s action.
One’s cutting one’s finger while making a salad is caused, in part, by other
people manufacturing knives; one’s stroke after a transatlantic flight is
caused, in part, by other people flying planes . . . and so on and so forth.”11
Therefore, if one of Kramer’s goals is to account for our pretheoretic no-
tions of self-inflicted and merely natural inabilities, his own criterion does
not do too well by some of his own standards.
B. Moral Responsibility
Miller argues that instead of causal responsibility we should invoke moral
responsibility. Accordingly, an obstacle y is an unfreedom-producing con-
straint, only if there is at least one person who is morally responsible for y.12
Miller suggests a disjunctive analysis of moral responsibility. Either a
person is morally responsible for an obstacle y because she intentionally
or negligently acted in a way that caused y. Or she is morally responsible
for y because she had a prima facie moral obligation to remove y or pre-
vent its creation.13 Prima facie obligations are moral obligations overrid-
able by other stronger moral considerations.
9. Also see Miller’s critical discussion and Kramer’s response in David Miller, “Reply
to Oppenheim,” Ethics 95 (1985): 310–14; Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, 338–40. Kramer
might also respond that we have to rely on counterfactual speculation in examples such
as Roaming. Moreover, Kramer advocates including probabilistic qualifications for com-
binations of specific freedoms and unfreedoms (see ibid., 174–78, 418–20). He could then
hold that because the causal relationship is so speculative, the remoteness of the relation-
ship between Roman builders and memight be reflected in a low probability ascribed to my
unfreedom in this case.
10. See Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, 351–53.
11. Ronen Shnayderman, “Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omis-
sions,” Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013): 716–39, 724.
12. See Miller, “Constraints on Freedom”; Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom.
13. See Miller, “Constraints on Freedom,” 72.
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The Obligation View: y is an unfreedom-producing constraint on
A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing and
(ii) there is at least one person who either imposed y intentionally or
negligently or whohas a prima faciemoral obligation to remove y or
prevent its creation.
The Obligation View includes omissions as possible sources of unfree-
dom and thus deals with Closed Door. Moreover, it does not classify re-
mote causal influences as sources of unfreedom and thus deals with
Roaming.
However, Miller is aware—and accepts—that specifying the condi-
tions under which a person has a prima facie obligation opens up the
conceptual debate to “a wide field for controversy.”14 What one believes
to be prima facie obligations often depends on the kind of normative
political theory one accepts. For example, radical libertarians and egalitar-
ians will strongly disagree about, say, our prima facie obligations to assist
poor people. Accordingly, some of thatmoral disagreement will carry over
to a disagreement about unfreedom.
Shnayderman has recently defended a new version of the Moral Re-
sponsibility View meant to avoid such moral disagreement.15 Drawing on
Philip Pettit’s work, Shnayderman invokes amore abstract and pragmatic
account of moral responsibility. Someone is morally responsible for an
act, when it is appropriate to apportion blame for that act in case that ac-
tion is seen as bad and praise in case it is seen as good (blame and praise
being shorthand for a range of reactive attitudes including gratitude,
resentment, etc.). It is not necessary that an act is actually seen as bad
or good or that the person doing it has any prima facie obligation to act a
certain way.16 Shnayderman writes that whether someone is appropriately
considered an object of praise or blame “is written, as Pettit puts it, into the
architecture of our psychology, into some of our most basic reactions to
one another as well as to ourselves, such as the resentment we feel towards
someone who harms us, the gratitude we feel towards someone who ben-
efits us.”17 Shnayderman now limits possible sources of unfreedom to acts
and excludes omissions to avoid false positives. For example, if we included
omissions, then our inability to fly to Mars would be considered an un-
freedom and not a mere inability, because we can hold the government
14. Ibid., 75.
15. Shnayderman also presents a critique of Kristja´nsson’s version of the Moral Respon-
sibility View in Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom.
16. See Philip Pettit, ATheory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2001), 12–13.
17. Shnayderman, “Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omissions,”
730–31.
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responsible for not investing resources to make such travel possible (leav-
ing aside questions of technical feasibility here).18
This is Shnayderman’s account:
The Act Responsibility View: y is an unfreedom-producing con-
straint on A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing
and (ii) there is at least one person whose act(s) caused y and who is
appropriately considered an object of either blame or praise for his or
her act(s).
Rather than a full-fledged critique of Shnayderman’s position, I here only
explain why I think excluding omissions as possible sources of unfreedom
is a mistake. As we will see later, my own account includes both acts and
omissions as possible sources of unfreedom.
Consider:
Trapped Boy: a young boy with a speleological interest explores a cave
located next to a busy street. A small rock rolls in front of the cave.
All the passers-by can see and hear the boy. They could release the
boy effortlessly (and they know they could) by simply taking one
step to the right off the street onto a panel in the ground. This panel
would activate a machine that would remove the rock. No one de-
cides to step onto the panel, and the boy languishes in the cave for
weeks.
No human action by another person caused the boy to lose his freedom
to walk out of the cave. Because Shnayderman restricts sources of un-
freedom to acts, he would have to say the boy is not unfree. Now, com-
pare Trapped Boy with:
Trapped Boy*: everything is as in Trapped Boy, except this time a panel
is located on the walkway and stepping on that panel will deactivate a
machine that would otherwise remove the rock. Passers-by continue
walking on their usual paths over the panel and the boy languishes in
the cave for weeks.
In Trapped Boy*, the boy is unable to leave the cave because of an act
(rather than an omission as in Trapped Boy). According to Shnayder-
man, he is therefore unfree in Trapped Boy*.
Shnayderman’s verdict in Trapped Boy would have to be that the
boy is not unfree, which seems counterintuitive. More important, it seems
difficult to motivate the different judgments in Trapped Boy and Trapped
Boy*. The effort or sacrifice required of passers-by for setting the boy
18. See ibid., 734.
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free—they need to step to the side—is the same in both cases. Moreover,
the relationship between the boy and the passers-by in both Trapped Boy
and Trapped Boy* is such that it strongly affects how freely the boy can
live his life. Shnayderman’s objective is to bring out that unfreedom, un-
like mere inability, is a type of social relation.19 But it is difficult to see
what the difference in terms of social relations between these two cases is
and why our theory should track it.
Moreover, our conception of unfreedom should tell us what we should
do, other things being equal, if we are concerned with other people’s free-
dom. Shnayderman would say that to not make others unfree, we should
step to the side in Trapped Boy* but lack such a reason in Trapped Boy.
This prescription seems problematic: both the resulting outcome (i.e.,
the boy being able to leave the cave) and the actions required to bring it
about are very much alike.20
The worry about normative guidance applies to many real-life cases
too. Consider people whosemedical condition or disabilities prevent them
from fully partaking in social life. We might think that apart from nonin-
terference, a concern for their freedom might imply providing assistance.
For example, imagine we could provide a very cheap and effective surgery
to a person with trachoma—an infection that can lead to blindness if left
untreated. Because not providing such a surgery is an omission, Shnay-
derman would rule it out as a source of unfreedom on conceptual grounds.
But it seems odd, I submit, to make such a judgment entirely on concep-
tual grounds. On the face of it, the situation seems to call for a genuinely
normative answer.
III. THE ABILITY VIEW
I now present a new theory. I start by outlining assumptions my view
makes about the structural conditions under which a person has the
specific freedom to do something. A specific freedom is the freedom to
do a specific thing or set of things.21 Your freedom to read this article is
an example of a specific freedom, but so are more general types of spe-
cific freedoms, such as your specific freedom tomove around in your neigh-
19. See ibid., 718.
20. Shnayderman can respond that we should step aside in both cases to make the boy
more free overall (although our reasons for doing so would be stronger in Trapped Boy*
than in Trapped Boy). For this, however, Shnayderman needs to assume a trivalent view of
freedom, according to which not being unfree does not imply being free (below I say more
on trivalence). Shnayderman himself wishes his account to be neutral with respect to the
trivalence/bivalence issue (see ibid., n. 3). Such neutrality, however, would have to be given
up for the ‘making the boy more free response’.
21. See Carter, A Measure of Freedom, chap. 1.
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borhood. Specific freedoms are different from overall freedom which is
about how much freedom a person has overall. (I will say more about
overall freedom in Sec. IV.)
My account relies on what is sometimes labeled ‘positive freedom’.
Such a view has recently been rather popular, partly because the capa-
bility approach has built a large following. Authors such as Amartya Sen,
Phillippe van Parijs, Matthew Kramer, and G. A. Cohen argue that ‘real’
freedom is not only the absence of interference but about what a per-
son is actually able to do.22 To be able to J—in the technical sense in which
I use this expression here—implies having both the internal ability (phys-
ical, cognitive, etc.) and the external resources and opportunities (absence
of external restraint, monetary resources, etc.) to J.23 Being able to J is
considered both a necessary and sufficient condition for being free to J:
The Ability View of Freedom: A is free to J, if and only if A is able
to J.24
However, many liberal theories of sociopolitical freedom traditionally
assume a different and incompatible view (either explicitly or implicitly).
The idea is that out of all obstacles that constrain a person’s abilities, only
a subset also affect her freedom. For example, proponents of such a view
might hold that I am free to run one hundred meters in under ten sec-
onds, even though physical constraints mean I am unable to. On this view,
the absence of proper unfreedom-producing constraints is a necessary
and sufficient condition for being free.
The Restraint View: A is free to J, if and only if A is not subject to
any unfreedom-producing constraints with respect to J-ing.
The Ability View of Freedom produces different judgments than the
Restraint View in two sorts of cases.
22. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures
1984,” Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 169–221, “Freedom of Choice: Concept and Con-
tent,” European Economic Review 32 (1988): 269–94, “Welfare, Preference and Freedom,”
Journal of Econometrics 50 (1991): 15–29, and Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1999); Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify
Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 20–24; G. A. Cohen, “Freedom and Money,” in On the
Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2011), 196–97; Kramer, The Quality of Freedom. Although, as we will see, Kram-
er’s view differs in important ways from those of the other authors listed.
23. For a discussion of abilities, see John Maier, “Abilities,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014
/entries/abilities/.
24. Kramer calls this the ‘F-Postulate’; see Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, 3.
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First, unlike the Restraint View, the Ability View judges that internal
constraints on a person’s abilities can by themselves determine whether
she is specifically free to do something. For example, the Ability View
holds that irremediable physical disabilities constitute a lack of freedom.
The Restraint View, on the other hand, would typically hold that such
disabilities by themselves do not constitute a lack of freedom but merely
a lack of ability.
Second, the two views deal differently with ‘external, merely natural’
constraints. Consider:
Boulder : I am on a speleological expedition and get trapped in a
cave, because a boulder rolls in front of it. No one is there to help,
and no one is responsible for the boulder blocking the cave.
Assume the boulder is an external, merely natural constraint and does
not count as an unfreedom-producing constraint. On the Restraint View,
we would then say that I am in fact free to leave the cave. Accordingly, I
am also free to walk around outside the cave, free to go to a dinner party,
and so on, because no unfreedom-producing constraint impedes me from
doing any of these actions. The Ability View, on the other hand, would
say that I am not free to leave the cave, not free to go to a dinner party,
and so on. For I lack the ability to do any of these actions. More generally
on the Ability View, external, merely natural constraints by themselves
affect my freedom.
Henceforth, I assume the Ability View about specific freedom. I think
the above considerations—to do with illness, disabilities, and natural ex-
ternal constraints—speak for the Ability View. Intuitively, how freely one
can live one’s life seems to depend, among other things, on the range of
one’s abilities, and we should expect a theory of freedom to capture this.
I will, however, not give a sufficient and systematic defense of the Ability
View here.25 Rather, my aim is to show that, surprisingly, the Ability View
holds the key to a plausible distinction between unfreedom and inability.
Note, however, that the Ability View of Freedom does not imply that
every constraint on a person’s ability also makes her unfree. I follow, at
least in a structural sense, Kramer’s position on when a person is unfree as
opposed to merely unable to do something:
The Ability View of Unfreedom: A is unfree to J, if and only if (i)
there is at least one unfreedom-producing constraint on A’s free-
25. I do not think this assumption invalidates the value of my constructive proposal in
this article. First, competing accounts, such as Miller’s or Kristja´nsson’s, assume the opposite
view, i.e., the Restraint View, without defense. Second, others have provided a strong system-
atic defense of the Ability View, particularly the authors listed in n. 22.
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dom to J and (ii) in the absence of all unfreedom-producing
constraints, A would be able to J.26
Because of condition i, it is not the case that all inabilities are also con-
sidered unfreedoms. A view such as Kramer’s holds that one can be unfree
to J, only if one is subject to a proper unfreedom-producing constraint
with respect to J-ing. Following Kramer here makes my position trivalent:
it allows for three categories, ‘free’, ‘unfree’, and ‘merely unable’. Being
unfree to J implies that one is not free to J. However, it is not the case
that not being free to J implies being unfree to J. There is a third cat-
egory, being ‘merely unable to J’.
Unfree→ ¬Free
¬ð¬Free→UnfreeÞ:
This idea is called Trivalence.27 Combining Trivalence and the Ability
View is a departure from both traditional Restraint Views as well as most
‘positive freedom’ views. On the one hand, it departs from the Restraint
View because it holds that all constraints on a person’s abilities constitute
a lack of freedom. For example, physical disabilities constitute a lack of
freedom (in the sense of ‘not being free to do something’). On the other
hand, my view also departs from most views of positive freedom because I
do not hold that all constraints on a person’s abilities are ipso facto sources
of unfreedom. Mere ability constraints, such as my inability to run one
hundred meters in under ten seconds, influence my range of abilities
without making me unfree. Similarly, external constraints that are not
unfreedom-producing constraints, as in Boulder, for example, affect my
freedom without making me unfree. Only proper unfreedom-producing
constraints affect a person’s range of freedoms and make her unfree.
Condition ii holds that A can only be unfree to J, if A would be able
to J, if all unfreedom-producing constraints were removed. This con-
dition avoids the counterintuitive implication that if someone makes
you unfree to leave your house, she also makes you unfree to jump to
the moon, unfree to eat an airplane, and so on. On the Ability View of
26. This formulation is broader than Kramer’s U-Postulate, because it does not restrict
unfreedom-producing constraints to actions (or dispositions to act). See Kramer, The Quality
of Freedom, 3; Ronen Shnayderman, “Causal Tests in Subjunctive Judgements about Negative
Freedom,” Res Publica 20 (2014): 183–97.
27. This idea is discussed in J. P. Day, “Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 257–72; defended at length in Kramer, The Quality
of Freedom; and also endorsed by Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a
Difference with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory 30 (2002): 342–43, and On the People’s Terms:
A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 36.
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Unfreedom, one is not made unfree to do these things, as one would not
be able to do them in the absence of unfreedom-producing constraints.
I next show how the trivalent Ability View helps us determine which
obstacles are mere ability constraints and which ones unfreedom-producing
constraints.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTIVE VIEW
The view I defend now seeks a strong systematic separation between ques-
tions of freedom and those of unfreedom. First, as explained above, the
view assumes that a person’s specific freedom to do something is equiva-
lent to her being able to do it (the Ability View). Second, the view accepts
Trivalence, according to which not being free does not imply being unfree;
there are cases in which a person is neither free nor unfree but merely
unable to do something. Third, the view holds that whether someone is
unfree as opposed to merely unable to do something is an inherently
normative question. More specifically, describing a constraint as making
someone unfree as opposed to merely unable expresses a normative con-
cern for how this constraint affects that person’s abilities. The view de-
fended here separates descriptive talk about freedom from inherently
normative talk about unfreedom:
The Separation Thesis: One area of freedom talk is nonnormative
while the other is inherently normative. The nonnormative sense
describes what a person is able to do with her life and is capturedby
the Ability View of Freedom. The other, normative sense expresses
normative concerns about how other people’s behavior influences a
person’s range of abilities. The latter is about situations in which a
person ismade unfree as opposed tomerely unable.
To illustrate, think of cases such as Boulder in which a person is unable to
leave a cave because of merely natural external constraints. One perfectly
natural way to describe the situation is to say that the person clearly lacks
freedom because she is unable to leave the cave. Such a description would
be covered by the nonnormative side of freedom talk and the Ability View
of Freedom. But if we accept Trivalence and the Separation Thesis, we
can say that the person is not made unfree. For, as is assumed in the
example, there is no normative concern about how other people’s behav-
ior affects her abilities. Therefore, the inherently normative side of free-
dom talk, which pertains to ‘unfreedom’, does not apply here. Of course,
our verdict would be different had someone lured the person into the
cave and then rolled a boulder in front of it. Talking about one person
making another unfree would then be apposite, as there is a normative
concern about how one person’s behavior influences another person’s
range of abilities.
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The Separation Thesis is a rather abstract claim. It does not spec-
ify when and on the basis of which normative concern we should label
instances of abilities-affecting behavior as sources of unfreedom. In prin-
ciple, we could plug in different normative theories: we could say that an
obstacle is an unfreedom-producing constraint only if the constraint takes
away an ability the other person has a right to have, or is best for her to
have, or which she should have as a matter of justice, and so on. Accord-
ingly, the Separation Thesis—and thus this part of my overall argument—
can be accepted with different normative background pictures.
But now I also want to do more and offer a specific normative pro-
posal to fill in the Separation Thesis. The basic idea of the Distributive
View is that the notion of an unfreedom-producing constraint is con-
ceptually linked to social distributions of freedom. This view resonates
with the traditional idea that it lies in the nature of freedom as a value in
social settings to place reciprocal limits on people’s range of possibilities.
For example, many theorists suggest that one is not unfree, if one has all
the freedoms one would have in a scheme that safeguards the greatest
equal freedom for all. Jan Narveson holds: “Proposing to make liberty a
right means that we are turning the liberty of each into a constraint on the
liberty of others. Only ‘compossible’ liberty will be supported: liberty that
is compatible with the ‘like liberty of all’—to use Rawls’s earlier words, or,
in Kant’s terms, ‘such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the
will of each and all in action, according to a universal law.’ Or again, in
Hobbes’s version, ‘that every man be contented with somuch liberty against
other men, as he would allow other men against himself.’”28
Now, Kant, Rawls, Hobbes, and Narveson each defend very differ-
ent theories of freedom in general and accounts of ‘compossibility’ in
particular. Moreover, each of these views diverges strongly from the pic-
ture suggested here (for a start, none of the authors in the quotation
accepts the Ability View, and I am not defending a right to freedom).
Nonetheless, I think there is a more abstract, common theme behind
these different ideas: namely, that it lies in the nature of freedom as a
social value to place ‘reciprocal’ limits on people’s range of options. One
is only made unfree on such a picture if one is constrained from having
those freedoms one should have in the appropriate social scheme of
freedoms. The Distributive View invokes this broad idea when charac-
terizing sources of unfreedom.
More specifically, the Distributive View consists of two conditions.
First, an obstacle is an unfreedom-producing constraint and not a mere
ability constraint only if it withholds a freedom a person would have
28. Jan Narveson, “The Right to Liberty Is Incompatible with the Right to Equality,” in
Are Liberty and Equality Compatible?, by Jan Narveson and James P. Sterba (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), 123–252, 131.
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in the ideal distribution of freedom. Because I have assumed the Abil-
ity View, freedoms are here equated with abilities. Thus I do not mean a
distribution of all relevant goods but only a distribution of freedoms
identified as abilities. ‘Ideal’ refers to the distribution that is best in a
moral sense. For example, one popular suggestion would be to say that
the best distribution of freedom is the one with greatest equal freedom
(more on this below). The second condition is our responsibility con-
dition, and here I am following Shnayderman (who follows Pettit): for a
person to be responsible for an unfreedom-producing constraint, she
needs to be appropriately considered an object of blame or praise with
respect to the act or omission that led to the constraint (remember that I
rejected Shnayderman’s exclusion of omissions as sources of unfreedom).
Combining the ideal distribution idea and the ‘responsibility con-
dition’ in our biconditional:
The Distributive View: y is an unfreedom-producing constraint
on A’s freedom to J, if and only if (i) y impedes A from J-ing and
(ii) there is at least one person B whose imposition or nonremoval
of y or whose failure to prevent y’s creation withholds A’s freedom to
J that A would have in an ideal distribution of freedom and (iii) B
is appropriately considered an object of blame or praise with respect
to the imposition or nonremoval of y or the failure to prevent y’s
creation.
For example, if a person locks you into her basement, she foreseeably re-
moves abilities and thus freedoms you would have in an ideal distribu-
tion of freedom. Moreover, she is, let us assume, appropriately consid-
ered an object of praise or blame with respect to her acts that led to the
constraint. Therefore, you are considered unfree as opposed to merely
unable. My inability to recite the first fifty thousand digits of p, on the
other hand, is not a source of unfreedom. For it is not an ability I would
have in an ideal distribution of abilities. This is the basic idea. Let me
explain in more detail its different elements.
A. The Distribution of What?
Is it viciously circular to include the distribution of freedom in the de-
finiens of an unfreedom-producing constraint? Not so. Remember I iden-
tified specific freedom with ability (the Ability View). From this charac-
terization of specific freedom, we can then move on to a distribution of
freedom across persons. From this characterization of the ideal distribu-
tion of freedom and together with the ‘responsibility condition’, we can
then move on to characterize unfreedom—no circularity here.
What precisely is our distribuendum in this distribution? The distri-
buendum is individual overall freedom. Many different measures (and rank-
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ings) of overall freedom have recently been proposed. Usually, such theo-
ries defend an account of specific freedoms and then aggregate specific
freedoms into ameasure of overall freedom. A great deal of debate revolves
around how precisely that should be done.29 Different approaches are
possible in this context. Here I only need to make the assumption that
making such comparative judgments about people’s overall range of free-
doms between persons is possible, which is a relatively widely shared as-
sumption. I do not need to assume a particular measure that gives us very
precise numbers.
I am also assuming, quite plausibly, that when comparing distri-
butions of freedom, we focus on somewhat general types of freedom.30
Whether I would have the freedom to play sports in the best distribution
of freedom, for example, should not be decided by whether I would have
the freedom to play tennis at a particular court at a particular time today.
30. Carter distinguishes between types and tokens of specific freedom; see Carter, A
Measure of Freedom, 186. One might object that specific freedoms will always be types and
never tokens, as even freedoms with very narrow spatiotemporal specifications might still
have to rely on general descriptions. I here remain agnostic on this. All I am assuming is
that we are concerned with somewhat general types of freedom rather than freedoms that
are very narrowly specified in spatiotemporal terms (be they aptly labeled ‘tokens’ or ‘very
narrow types’).
29. See Hillel Steiner, “How Free: Computing Personal Liberty,” Royal Institute of Phi-
losophy Supplements 15 (1983): 73–89; Carter, A Measure of Freedom; Robert Sugden, “The
Metric of Opportunity,” Economics and Philosophy 14 (1998): 307–37; Martin van Hees, Legal
Reductionism and Freedom (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012); Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, for
work in philosophy, and Walter Bossert, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Yongsheng Xu,
“Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach,” Journal of Economic Theory 63 (1994):
326–45; Walter Bossert, “Opportunity Sets and Individual Well-Being,” Social Choice and
Welfare 14 (1997): 97–112; Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert, “Freedom of Choice: A Comparison of
Different Rankings of Opportunity Sets,” Social Choice and Welfare 10 (1993): 189–207;
Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu, “On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of
Freedom of Choice,” Recherches E´conomiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review 56 (1990):
383–90, “On Preference and Freedom,” Theory and Decision 44 (1998): 173–98, and “On
Diversity and Freedom of Choice,” Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000): 123–30; Clemens
Puppe, “An Axiomatic Approach to ‘Preference for Freedom of Choice,’” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 68 (1996): 174–99; Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe, “On theMulti-preference
Approach to Evaluating Opportunities,” Social Choice and Welfare 16 (1999): 41–63; Sen, “Well-
Being, Agency and Freedom,” and “Welfare, Preference and Freedom”; Kenneth Arrow, “A
Note on Freedom and Flexibility,” in Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of
Amartya K. Sen, ed. Kaushik Basu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Ko¯taro¯ Suzumura (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1995), 7–16; Martin van Hees, “On the Analysis of Negative Freedom,” Theory and
Decision 45 (1998): 175–97; Martin van Hees, “Freedom of Choice and Diversity of Options:
Some Difficulties,” Social Choice and Welfare 22 (2004): 253–66, for examples of work in eco-
nomics. One relevant complicating factor will be discussed in Sec. V.B: unlike most econo-
mists writing on the topic, Steiner, Carter, and Kramer argue that a person’s overall freedom is
a function of both her freedoms and her unfreedoms, whereas I am using a measure that
excludes unfreedoms at this stage (see n. 54).
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Rather, the best distribution will look at types of freedom that cover dif-
ferent ways of doing the same or similar things (such as playing tennis)
stretched out over different time periods.
B. The Ideal Distribution
The Distributive View characterizes unfreedom-producing constraints
by invoking the ideal distribution of freedom. But which distribution is
ideal? Assume a set of distributions of freedom available to a given society.
Assume also we have a way of ranking distributions of freedom in this set
in terms of betterness. The ideal distribution is then simply the best dis-
tribution in the set of available distributions.
The first question is what determines which distributions are avail-
able and which ones are not. The basic idea is this. To determine the set
of possible worlds which contain the available distributions, we hold con-
stant one set of properties but vary others. The list of properties to hold
constant at all times includes obvious factors like the laws of nature, for
example. But to determine the set of available distributions at a particular
time, we will also hold constant (some part of) our available technology,
geographic conditions at that time, and so on. When technology changes
over time, the set of available distributions of freedoms will change too.
The distributions of freedoms available to a society in the Middle Ages,
for example, is different from those available to us. Among the factors we
do not hold constant at particular times are those of social organization
and individual behavior. The variable factors will include those relative to
which agents are appropriately considered objects of praise and blame.
The set of available distributions will, for example, include the different
distributions of freedom had under different social, economic, and politi-
cal arrangements.31
The second question concerns the betterness ranking of distribu-
tions of abilities. I think most would agree that we should not maximize
the societal sum of individual freedom (understood as abilities) without
taking into account its distribution. For one thing, we might worry that
freedom has decreasing marginal value. An additional ‘unit’ of freedom
might matter less, the more freedom one already has. Of course, whether
that is the case is still open to debate.32 But another more systematic reason
31. Note two complicating factors. First, certain types of factors will not always fall in
the same category. For example, if technology, medicine, or certain public health condi-
tions are the foreseeable result of human actions or omissions, they can be among the set
of variable rather than fixed factors. Second, how to flesh out ‘availability’ will remain
somewhat vague here, as a precise answer also depends on where one stands on the ideal/
nonideal theory issue.
32. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988); Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice (New York: Harper Collins,
2009). Whether these arguments imply that freedom has decreasing marginal value also
194 Ethics October 2016
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on January 30, 2019 03:26:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
against maximizing is a concern for fairness. We might find it unjust or
unfair to reduce one person’s freedom to a very low level to increase the
aggregate freedom of others. Or we might simply believe that those who
are worse off should be given priority as a matter of fairness. In fact, most
authors assume that we should notmaximize the social sum of freedom. As
mentioned above, many authors believe that a right to freedom translates
into a right to the greatest equal freedom. Different versions of this idea
are defended by a broad and diverse range of authors, including Kant,
Mill, Hobbes, Rawls, Herbert Spencer, and Richard Norman.33 Other au-
thors hold that fairness and equality should play some role in how people’s
claims to freedom are balanced with each other.34 Despite their many
disagreements, the above authors all seem to endorse the more abstract
idea that equality (or fairness) plays an important role in how we balance
people’s claims to personal freedom. To translate this abstract idea into the
parameters set out by the Ability View, the Distributive View incorporates
distributional concerns into our betterness ranking.
However, that equality matters for ranking distributions does not
mean that it is the only thing that matters (or that a concern for equality
is lexically prior to other concerns). Natural abilities will differ to a great
extent, and not all of these inequalities can be offset. Completely equal-
izing the extent of everyone’s freedom would imply implausible level-
ing down given that I am assuming the Ability View. So, while a plausible
ranking involves a concern for fairness and equality, it is also concerned
with the overall societal amount of freedom.
Given limited space, I have not tried to present a fully worked-out
theory of how to rank distributions of freedom (although I do so else-
33. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971),
60, 302; Herbert Spencer, Social Statics; or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified,
and the First of Them Developed (New York: Appleton, 1873), 35; Richard J. Norman, Free and
Equal: A Philosophical Examination of Political Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987);
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996), pt. 1; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1982), chap. 14.
Pettit draws on these ideas through his invocation of basic liberties; see Philip Pettit, Just
Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York: Norton, 2014), chap. 3. Steiner holds
that freedom ought to be distributed equally but that it does not make sense to aim for great-
est equal freedom because distributions of freedom are always zero-sum affairs; see Steiner,
“Individual Liberty,” “Capitalism, Justice and Equal Starts,” Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987):
49–71, and An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Wiley, 1994). Carter presents strong arguments against
Steiner’s zero-sum thesis; see Carter, A Measure of Freedom, chap. 9.4.
34. See Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All.
depends on more theoretical assumptions, such as the question as to whether and in which
sense freedom has nonspecific or intrinsic value; see Carter, A Measure of Freedom, chap. 2;
and Andreas T. Schmidt, “Why Animals Have an Interest in Freedom,” Historical Social
Research 40 (2015): 92–109.
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where) or to dispel all possible disagreement on this matter.35 My aims
in this context are more modest: first, to highlight the theoretical rela-
tion between unfreedom and distributions of freedom (whatever the cor-
rect ranking of such distributions is); second, to provide some aspects of
a plausible betterness ranking that yield intuitive judgments in the afore-
mentioned examples and are acceptable to a relatively broad range of
views on distributive ethics.36
C. Withholding
Next, what do I mean by ‘withholding’? First, ‘withholding’ here cov-
ers both acts and omissions. To decide whether person B withholds A’s
freedom does not merely require comparing a specific act of imposing a
constraint with the situation in which B does not so act. Rather, to estab-
lish whether a person B makes A unfree, we have to consider the whole
range of possible actions and omissions available to B.
Second, ‘withholding’ is understood broadly such that it avoids
problems of overdetermination. If B withholds A’s freedom to J, then
this does not imply that A would not be impeded from J-ing in the ab-
sence of B’s withholding. For there could be further unfreedom-producing
constraints impeding A from J-ing. We can invoke Mackie’s INUS condi-
tion: if B withholds A’s freedom to J through obstacle y, then y is an
insufficient but necessary component in an unnecessary but sufficient con-
dition for A being impeded from J-ing.37
D. Responsibility
In some cases, someone’s behavior does not make another person un-
free on the Distributive View, even though it withholds an ability that
person would have in the best available distribution. The reason for this
is the ‘responsibility condition’: only constraints for which someone is ap-
35. See Andreas Schmidt, “Freedom and Its Distribution” (DPhil, University of Oxford,
2014).
36. As explained earlier, Miller’s invocation of prima facie obligations (and to a lesser
extent negligence) will make his account of freedom and unfreedom subject to disagree-
ments about justice and morality. Normative disagreement is somewhat less problematic
for the Distributive View than for Miller: first, normative disagreement here is about how
to rank distributions of abilities. We should expect there to be less disagreement on this
rather more specific question than on questions of overall social justice. Second, the Dis-
tributive View is a trivalent position. Even if we disagree about what the correct ranking
is, this only affects judgments about unfreedom but not freedom. OnMiller’s bivalent view,
on the other hand, normative disagreement affects both freedom and unfreedom (in cases
involving omissions and those in which there is disagreement about what counts as ‘neg-
ligence’).
37. See John Leslie Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1980), chap. 2.
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propriately considered an object of praise or blame can be unfreedom-
producing constraints. Let us briefly look at three situations—not meant
as a comprehensive list—in which it is appropriate to suspend attributions
of responsibility.
First, to be considered an appropriate object of blame and praise,
one needs to have sufficient evidence :
Boulder* : I am on a speleological expedition and get trapped in a
cave, because a boulder rolls in front of it. The next day a person in
a heavy-duty vehicle drives past. The vehicle could be used to
remove the rock. But the driver does not have reason to believe that
anyone is in the cave and drives past.
The Distributive View judges that the person driving past does not make
me unfree. Even though removing the rock would give me many more
freedoms, the person’s omission is not an unfreedom-producing con-
straint. For the driver did not have accessible evidence to believe that
removing the rock would set me free. We would therefore not consider
her an appropriate target of blame or praise with respect to the con-
straints in this instance. (Because the Distributive View is coupled with a
trivalent Ability View, however, we would judge that I am neither free nor
unfree to leave the cave; I am merely unable.)
Second, lack of choice can also make it inappropriate to consider
someone an object of blame or praise.
Gunman: you have the key to my room. A gunman holds a gun to
your head and forces you to close the door and thus entrap me in it
for hours.
Although you had sufficient evidence that your act was going to entrap
me in my room, the responsibility condition is not met, because you
were forced to lock me in. But we would still say that I was made unfree.
The Distributive View would hold that it was the gunman who, through
his actions, foreseeably withheld a freedom I would have in an ideal
distribution of freedom (let us assume he fulfilled all other conditions
for responsibility).
Third, the responsibility condition also implies a certain compe-
tence with moral concepts and an ability to shape one’s conduct in re-
sponse to perceived moral reasons. In most instances, it seems, for ex-
ample, that nonhuman animals do not sufficiently grasp the relevant
moral concepts in a way that it would make it appropriate for us to hold
them responsible.38 Only those persons who are in a position to perceive
38. See Pettit, Theory of Freedom, 13.
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moral reasons and adjust their behavior in light of them can make us
unfree.39
V. ADVANTAGES AND OBJECTIONS
With the details of the Distributive View laid out, let us now discuss ar-
guments for and against it. Let me start with the advantages.
A. Advantages
1. Examples.—One advantage is that the Distributive View gives us intui-
tive judgments in the aforementioned examples. Moreover, it provides
plausible explanations for these judgments and gives us a neat frame-
work to talk more clearly about freedom and unfreedom.
First, the Distributive View gives us prima facie plausible judgments
and explanations in cases in which an obstacle seems to make someone
unable but not unfree. The Distributive View is not too wide. I have
already explained how the Distributive View would deal with Boulder*.
Let us now return to earlier examples. Am I made unfree to live in a
golden castle? The answer is no, because I would not have this freedom
in an ideal distribution of freedom. To accommodate me with the ability
to live in a golden castle would require pooling too many resources and
thereby deprive other people of toomany (andmore valuable) freedoms.
Am I unfree to run one hundred meters in under 10 seconds? No,
because I would quite likely not have this freedom in an ideal distribution
of freedom (although the case might be different for Usain Bolt). In
Roaming, I am unable as opposed to unfree. For Roman builders are not
appropriately considered objects of blame or praise with respect to the
leaf being deflected from the coliseum.
Second, the Distributive View is not too narrow. It gives us intuitive
results in cases in which constraints seemed like genuine sources of
unfreedom. Remember that the Distributive View includes omissions as
possible sources of unfreedom. In Closed Door, I am considered un-
free as opposed to merely unable. For the janitor could have easily dis-
charged his duty and had sufficient evidence that doing so would have
made available a type of freedom I would have in an ideal distribution.
In both Trapped Boy and Trapped Boy*, the boy is considered unfree.
The people passing by foreseeably withhold freedoms the boy would
have in an ideal distribution of freedom. In Trapped Boy they do so
through an omission, in Trapped Boy* through an act. I think the Dis-
39. See ibid., 19. I am not committed to the claim that it is necessarily and always
inappropriate to hold such reactive attitudes toward nonhuman animals. But it will usually
be so. And, as always, there will be other marginal cases, e.g., those involving very young
children, persons with strong cognitive disabilities, etc.
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tributive View also gives us a plausible framework to evaluate cases involv-
ing health and disability. Remember our earlier example. Does a concern
for freedom require that we provide a cost-effective surgery to a person
with trachoma, if doing so would prevent blindness? The Distributive
View would hold that providing such a surgery enables the person to
have abilities—through eyesight—she would have in an ideal distribu-
tion of freedom. Therefore, not providing such a surgery is a source of
unfreedom.
However, my argument for the Distributive View does not rest solely
on intuitions (these will remain somewhat contentious in any case). It also
has important systematic advantages, as I discuss now.
2. Unfreedom and justification.—The Distributive View explains in
which sense unfreedom-producing constraints typically call for a justifi-
cation in a way that mere ability constraints do not. As Miller writes:
“Whenwe say of anobstacle that it renders a personunfree to act, wemake
a charge that stands in need of rebuttal. Reasons have to be given for the
continued presence of the obstacle.”40 There are two reasons why the
Distributive View accounts very well for the connection between unfree-
dom and justification.41
First, because of the responsibility clause, only those agents can
make others unfree who are appropriately considered objects of blame
or praise. And only of those agents is it usually appropriate to request a
justification.42
Second, there is good reason, at least pro tanto and prima facie, to
care about the best available distribution of freedom. If someone with-
holds a freedom I would have in the ideal distribution of freedom, then
such withholding stands in need of justification, because it is usually
good (at least pro tanto and prima facie) to have such freedoms. That
unfreedom-producing constraints usually require a justification is of
course compatible with there often being a good justification for them.
For there are other values apart from freedom. We sometimes have to
balance a concern for freedom with other normative ideals such as
happiness, security, or desert.43
40. Miller, “Constraints on Freedom,” 69.
41. Unlike Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom, I merely claim that imposing an unfreedom
usually requires a justification, not that unfreedom can be defined in terms of a need to
provide a justification.
42. Also see Pettit, Theory of Freedom, on ‘discursive control’.
43. There are further types of justification. First, I assume neither that freedom is
intrinsically valuable nor that more of it is always better all things considered. We can allow
that freedom might be merely instrumentally valuable or even that there are disabling
conditions for freedom’s (intrinsic or instrumental) value in the sense of holism about
reasons; see Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006); Pekka
Va¨yrynen, “Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation,” Ethics 116 (2006): 707–41. Second, in
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3. Abilities and social relations.—An important advantage of the
Distributive View is that it combines two compelling yet seemingly in-
compatible aspects of freedom. On the one hand, it invokes the wide-
spread idea that real freedom is about having abilities, about what peo-
ple are actually able to do with their lives. On the other hand, it accounts
for the idea that interpersonally imposed constraints on freedom are
normatively more significant than impersonal ones. The Distributive
View—better than any other theory I know—combines these two per-
spectives. We care more about unfreedom than inability, because we care
about freedom and its distribution. The social relations instantiated in
unfreedom-producing constraints matter precisely because they affect
people’s abilities. Rather than relying on a vague idea of ‘freedom as a
social relation’, the Distributive View thus gives us a good explanation as
to why such unfreedom-producing constraints matter—an explanation
that is internal to a normative concern about freedom and its distribu-
tion between persons. The Distributive View is thus more unified and
theoretically deeper than other accounts currently on offer.
To better appreciate this explanation, consider one of Pettit’s ob-
jections to liberal theories of freedom. Pettit distinguishes between
theories of option freedom (i.e., theories about the range of people’s
options) and theories of status freedom. He argues that many liberal
theories of option freedom lack motivation for placing so much value on
the distinction between unfreedom and inability: “If we are interested in
the option-freedom that someone enjoys, then it should be clear that the
source of the external influences on that freedom is of no relevance.
Take any influence that affects the number of options available to a per-
son, . . . the fact that this stems from an interpersonal rather than
an impersonal cause is neither here nor there from the point of view of
how their option-freedom fares.”44 If we care about a person’s range of
options, why should we care so much, as liberal theorists typically do,
about whether a constraint has an interpersonal rather than impersonal
source?
In a similar spirit, Cohen holds that it is clear that a person’s abilities
matter for how free a person is to lead her life. Cohen favors a ‘positive’
view of freedom and is very critical of the distinction between inability
44. Philip Pettit, “Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom,” Journal of Theoretical Politics
15 (2003): 387–403, 393.
some nonideal situations, we might have sufficient reason to withhold a person’s freedoms
she would have in an ideal distribution of freedom, if doing so is necessary to prevent her
from instigating further unfreedom-producing constraints. For example, a concern for
freedom might require restricting an illiberal agitator’s freedom of speech in a crisis
situation.
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and unfreedom. Such a distinction, Cohen holds, is a “right-wing myth”
and rides “roughshod over what appear to me banal truths.”45
Pettit’s and Cohen’s worries are of course not full-blown arguments
but rather challenges for those that think the distinction between un-
freedom and inability is important. Negative freedom theorists typically
respond that this distinction is important for any plausible account of
social freedom. Freedom is a relation between persons, and the distinc-
tion between unfreedom and mere inability brings out freedom’s in-
herently social nature.46 Moreover, such a distinction is reflected in the
way we often talk about freedom and unfreedom, as various examples
discussed in this article suggest.
Now, in contrast to the answer provided by the authors listed above,
the answer given by the Distributive View is more likely to resonate with
positive freedom theorists. Because we have assumed Trivalence, our
theory of freedom is exclusively about a person’s abilities. The sources of
constraints are neither here nor there. This accounts for both Pettit’s
and Cohen’s worry: when we are concerned with a person’s freedom,
it seems obvious we should be concerned with a person’s abilities and
not focus exclusively on interpersonally imposed constraints. At the same
time, however, our account of unfreedom explains why (certain types
of) interpersonal causes of inability seem normatively more important
than impersonal ones. According to the Distributive View, we care more
about unfreedom than mere inability, because we care about acts that
stand in the way of good distributions of abilities. This explanation fore-
grounds freedom as ability, which is precisely what positive freedom the-
orists care about. Therefore, this explanation is more continuous with
positive freedom views than that traditionally provided by negative free-
dom theorists.
B. Objections
Let us now discuss three objections.
1. Moralized.—Cohen has made a convincing case against moral-
ized theories of freedom.47 Cohen’s prime targets hereby are libertarians
such as Robert Nozick. Because such theories define freedom in terms
45. Cohen, “Freedom and Money,” 196–97.
46. See Steiner, “How Free,” 75–76, and An Essay on Rights, 43–44; Shnayderman,
“Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omissions”; Miller, “Constraints on
Freedom,” 69–70; Carter, A Measure of Freedom, 172–73; Kristja´nsson, Social Freedom, 10–13;
Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, 359–68.
47. See G. A. Cohen, “Illusions about Private Property and Freedom,” in Issues in
Marxist Philosophy, ed. JohnMepham and David Ruben (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), 4:223–
42, and Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995),
chaps. 2–4.
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of moral rights, Cohen objects that freedom is not doing any indepen-
dent justificatory work. Ian Carter generalizes Cohen’s critique: “By
‘moralizing’ the notion of freedom—bymaking themeaning of freedom
depend wholly on that of another good—one indeed disposes com-
pletely of the need to talk about freedom in any literal sense. Freedom
‘falls out of the picture’: it gets sacrificed as an ideal, and then defined
in terms of another ideal merely to conceal the fact.”48 In one sense, the
Distributive View is a moralized view, because it accepts the Separation
Thesis: unfreedom is inherently normative, because it makes reference
to an ideal distribution of freedom. However, the Distributive View is not
moralized in a problematic sense, because the objections Cohen and
Carter raise to previous moralized views do not apply to the Distributive
View.
First, unlike bivalent views of freedom, the Separation Thesis only
moralizes unfreedom but keeps freedom a nonmoralized concept. Be-
cause theDistributive View assumes theAbility View of Freedom, it does not
define freedom in terms of another value. Therefore, freedom does not
‘fall out of the picture’ on the Distributive View; freedom still does inde-
pendent justificatory work.
Second, the Distributive View characterizes unfreedom through the
best available distribution of freedom. A concern for the best available
distribution means that unfreedom-producing constraints stand in need
of justification. But it does not imply that they are necessarily unjust or
wrong all things considered. The Distributive View moralizes freedom in
a much less drastic way than traditional moralized views—such as No-
zick’s—which held that making someone unfree is wrong, all things
considered. Moreover, on the Distributive View, talking about unfree-
dom expresses a normative concern about freedom itself rather than
other values such as moral rights or justice. Therefore, the Distributive
View does not share the problematic features had by previous moralized
views and is thus not open to the same objections.
2. Imprisonment and intentions.—Some theorists—particularly lib-
erals—hold that imprisonment, even if justified, should always qualify as
a source of unfreedom (although other notable theorists disagree).49
Now, imagine cases in which imprisonment is necessary to safeguard the
best available distribution of freedom. In such cases, it seems the Dis-
48. Carter, A Measure of Freedom, 71. The quotation in this quotation is from G. A.
Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 296.
49. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty; Narveson, “The Right to Liberty Is Incom-
patible with the Right to Equality”; Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, sec.
6:321. Although there are different interpretations of Kant’s views on punishment; see
Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2010), chap. 10.
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tributive View would have to say that imprisonment is not a source of
unfreedom. Is the Distributive View in trouble?
The Distributive View plausibly deals with imprisonment. Remem-
ber that the Distributive View accepts the Ability View and Trivalence.
Accordingly, whenever an obstacle affects a person’s range of abilities,
it affects her freedom. Incarceration always affects a person’s range of
abilities. Therefore, the Distributive View will hold that imprisonment
always drastically reduces a person’s freedom—no matter how just in-
dividual instances of imprisonment might be.
But the Distributive View will also judge that imprisonment nearly
always makes prisoners unfree. First, remember that we rank distribu-
tions of freedom in terms of betterness without considering desert or
retributive justice. Therefore, even if instances of imprisonment are
deserved, this does not mean that imprisonment will be part of the best
distribution of freedom.
Second, nearly all actual instances of imprisonment will be absent
in the best distribution of freedom. Imprisonment usually leads to a
worse distribution of freedom by resulting in either less freedom overall
or a much more unequal distribution of freedom. Therefore, a concern
for the best distribution of freedom gives us good reason to keep prison
rates as low as possible. Moreover, for cases that are absolutely necessary,
alternatives to the current harsh system of incarceration might result in
greater andmore equally distributed freedom. For example, wemight opt
for shorter sentences, allow prisoners a much broader range of freedoms,
and orient our criminal justice system more toward rehabilitation.
Now, an objector might respond that while the Distributive View has
a plausible account of imprisonment, it still has a more fundamental
problem. Imprisonment is just one example of an intentionally imposed
constraint. Intentional constraints, the objection would go, should nec-
essarily be considered unfreedom-producing constraints. Shnayderman,
for example, holds that “one . . . [clear-cut] intuition says that a per-
son who is intentionally being physically prevented by another person
from xing is unfree to x.”50 If Shnayderman is right, the Distributive View
has a problem: it allows for intentional obstacles that do not qualify as
unfreedom-producing constraints.
However, I do not think that the intuition described by Shnayder-
man really is clear-cut. Consider:
Kidnapper : you have reliable information that a kidnapper is on his
way to your house to abduct you and your family. You close the door
to make sure he does not get into your house. Doing so prevents the
50. Shnayderman, “Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omissions,”
719.
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kidnapper from removing abilities you and your family would have
in the best available distribution of abilities.
The Distributive View holds that you do not make the kidnapper unfree
by closing your door. First, my intuition in Kidnapper, and that of at least
some theorists, is that this judgment is right; you do not make the kid-
napper unfree.51 Second, once we accept Trivalence, countervailing in-
tuitions in cases such as Kidnapper should carry much less weight anyway.
On the Distributive View, intentional obstacles to people’s abilities will
always affect their freedom. Closing the door reduces the kidnapper’s
freedom, because you have removed his ability to come into your house
and kidnap your family. This judgment is sufficient, I submit, to account
for the intuition that closing the door negatively affects the kidnapper’s
freedom. I do not see why we also need to say that the kidnapper is made
unfree.
3. Circularity.—The Distributive View ranks distributions of free-
dom by looking at people’s abilities in these distributions. However, au-
thors such as Steiner, Carter, and Kramer argue that an account of a
person’s overall freedom needs to include both a person’s freedoms and
her unfreedoms.52 They assume:
U-Inclusion: any adequate measure of a person’s overall freedom
needs to take account of both a person’s freedoms and unfreedoms.
U-Inclusion is relevant in cases such as:
Technology: at time t, person C has twenty freedoms. Person A and B
each have ten freedoms at t, because they have a disability that is
irremediable at t. At t1 1, a newmedical technology is available that
could give A and B their full range of abilities such that they would
have twenty freedoms each. However, at t 1 1, C actively locks this
technology away from A and B such that they continue to have just
ten freedoms each.
Because they assumeU-Inclusion, Steiner, Carter, and Kramer would pre-
sumably judge that A and B are less free overall at t1 1 than at t, because
they are subject to unfreedoms to which they were not subject before.
More generally, as Steiner writes: “For while it is undoubtedly true that the
average member of an advanced society is able to do, and unrestrained
from doing, many more actions than his counterparts in less advanced
51. Theorists who would agree include libertarians, Kant as well as republicans like
Pettit. We might interpret Kant in this case as holding that the ‘hindering of a hindrance to
freedom’ can itself be consistent with freedom; see Kant,TheMetaphysics of Morals, sec. 6:231.
52. See Steiner, “How Free”; Carter, A Measure of Freedom; Kramer, The Quality of Free-
dom. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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societies, it is equally true that he is . . . restrained from doing, manymore
actions than they. That is, there are many more actions which he is unfree
to do. Simply to ignore them in estimating the extent of a person’s liberty,
is to misconstrue the object of such an exercise.”53
But now the Distributive View seems to face a dilemma. Either it
rejects U-Inclusion and holds that a person’s overall freedom is exclu-
sively a function of a person’s freedoms (as, e.g., Cohen did). This, how-
ever, would require independent arguments against U-Inclusion. Or we
would have to show that the Distributive View does not reject U-Inclusion
in principle and that a ranking of freedom does take account of unfree-
doms. However, then it would seem problematically circular. On the Dis-
tributive View, we rank distributions of freedom to find out what un-
freedoms are. But if we include unfreedoms in our rankings, we seem to
end up with a circular account of unfreedom.
However, the Distributive View is not circular and thus escapes this
dilemma. Consider Technology again. We assume that at t, only one dis-
tribution of abilities is available, namely, D1. The Distributive View would
judge that A and B are not subject to unfreedom-producing constraints
in D1, because no better distribution of abilities is available.
At t D1
Abilities of A 10
Abilities of B 10
Abilities of C 20
However, the situation changes at t1 1. Because of the new medical
technology, two distributions, D2 and D2*, are now available. In D2, C ac-
tively withholds the relevant technology from A and B. In D2*, C does
not withhold the relevant technology, and A and B have more freedoms
accordingly.
At t 1 1 D2 D2*
Abilities of A 10 20
Abilities of B 10 20
Abilities of C 20 20
According to theDistributive View,A and B are subject to unfreedom-
producing constraints in D2 but not in D1. For at t 1 1, there is now an
53. Steiner, “How Free,” 76.
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available distribution, D2*, in which they would have more abilities and
which is thus the best available distribution at t 1 1. But this means that
the situation inD2 is different in terms of unfreedom than the situation in
D1: A and B are subject to more unfreedoms in D2 than they are in D1.
So, the Distributive View allows comparing situations in terms of freedom
and unfreedom without having to resort to a previously defined notion of
unfreedom.54
VI. CONCLUSION
I started this article by asking what distinguishes obstacles that make a
person unfree from those that make her merely unable. After outlining
some of the shortcomings of existing proposals, I argued for a new pro-
posal that started with the Separation Thesis: nonnormative talk about
what a person is free to do should be distinguished from inherently nor-
mative talk about unfreedom. To fill in the normative sense that char-
acterizes unfreedom, I then laid out the Distributive View: a constraint y
makes a person A unfree to J, if and only if there is another person who is
responsible for y, y impedes A from J-ing, and A would have the ability to
J in the best available distribution of abilities.
I argued that the Distributive View has important advantages over
existing proposals. Moreover, it reconciles two compelling yet seemingly
incompatible beliefs about freedom. On the one hand, many theorists
these days adopt a positive view of freedom, according to which real
54. Here are two finer points regarding my account of Technology. First, while the
Distributive View reaches the same ordinary ranking in Technology as Steiner, Carter, and
Kramer, it does not do so in all possible cases. (In any case, Steiner, Carter, and Kramer also
disagree among themselves.) My aim was to show that the Distributive View accounts for U-
Inclusion in a noncircular way, not that it always results in the same judgments as Steiner,
Carter, and Kramer. Second, I havemainly talked about specific freedom and unfreedom in
this article. But the Distributive View will also have implications for debates about overall
freedom—as is evident in Technology. Elsewhere I argue that we should apply the Sepa-
ration Thesis to overall freedom too and distinguish between (overall) Choice Freedom
and Normative Freedom; see Schmidt, “Freedom and Its Distribution.” Choice Freedom is
a descriptive concept and concerned exclusively with a person’s overall range of abilities.
Accordingly, measures of Choice Freedom do not include unfreedoms. Measures of Nor-
mative Freedom, on the other hand, do include unfreedoms. These measures thus also
provide normatively important information about how much of a person’s options are
being constrained by other persons. Choice Freedom resonates more with economists
working onmeasures of overall freedom, whereas Normative Freedom resonates more with
negative freedom theorists in philosophy, such as Steiner, Carter, and Kramer. The Dis-
tributive View implies that both concepts are relevant and provides a plausible connection
between the two: focusing exclusively on people’s abilities, it starts with a ranking of pos-
sible distributions of Choice Freedom. In a next step, it then uses these rankings to
determine what unfreedoms people are subject to. These unfreedoms will then be invoked
to ground judgments about how free these persons are in the sense of Normative Freedom.
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freedom is not just the absence of interference but about what people
are actually able to do with their lives. Ill health, disabilities, lack of
resources, inhospitable geographic conditions, and so on, all affect a
person’s freedom. Negative freedom theorists, on the other hand, insist
that freedom is an inherently social ideal and that philosophical theories
should reflect this by distinguishing between unfreedom and mere
inability. The Distributive View brings these ideas together: it relies on—
and lends support to—positive views of freedom while also bringing out
in which sense unfreedoms are normatively more important than mere
inabilities.
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